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Damage to goods and injury to the person, although they have been occasioned
by one and the same wrongful act, are infringements of different rights and give
rise 'to distinct causes of action ; and thcrefore the recovery in an action of compensation for the damage to the goods, is no bar to an action subsequently commenced
for the injury to the person.
So held by BRETT, M. R., and BOWEx, L. J., Lord COLgmIDGE, C. J., dissenting.
The plaintiff brought an action in a county court for damage to his cab, occasioned by the negligence of the defendant's servant, and having recovered the
amount claimed, afterwards brought an action in the High Court of Justice against
the defendant, claiming damages for personal injury sustained by the plaintiff
through the same negligence. Held, by BRETT, M. It., and BowEx, L. J., Lord
COLERIDGE, C. J., dissenting, that the action in the high court was maintainable,
and was not barred by the previous proceedings in the county court.
Judgment of the Queen's Bench Division (L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 712,) reversed.
APPEAL of the plaintiff against an order of the Queen's Bench
Division making absolute a rule to enter judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff, whilst he was driving his cab, came into
collision with a van of the defendant through the negligence of the
defendant's servant, whereby he sustained bodily injury and his
cab was damaged. The plaintiff, before the present action, sued
the defendant for damage to his cab in a county court, and the
defendant paid into court a small sum which was accepted, and
thereupon the action in the county court was discontinued. Upon
these facts the Queen's Bench Division entered judgment for the
defendant: (L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 712).

Waldy, Q. C., and Grispe, for plaintiff.
Murphy, Q. C., and T 0. Hannen, for defendant.
M. R.-This case was heard before PoLLOcu, B., and
The plaintiff was a cabman driving in his vehicle when
he was run into by the defendant's vehicle. The collision was
caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant. In the case
in which the present appeal is brought, the plaintiff has sued the
defendant for injury done to his person. The jury have found a
verdict for 3501., showing clearly that the personal injuries were
serious. Before this the plaintiff had brought an action in the
BRETT,

LOPES, J.
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county court for damage to his cab, by which he recovered a certain amount. In this second action it was urged that the plaintiff
could not succeed, because no person can sue twice for one and
the same cause of action. On the other side it was contended that
there were two distinct causes of action, and that there was no law
to prevent two actions; that it might be sometimes oppressive to
bring two actions, but that in that event the court might summarily
stay one of them, and that in the present case the two actions were
not oppressive. The question is whether there are two causes of
action, or whether there is only one ; and if there is but one cause
of action the present suit is not maintainable. For the defendint,
reliance has, in effect, been placed upon the maxim, interest reipublicx ut sitfinis litium: and it has been contended that it enunciates an admirable rule of law. When that rule is applied to
damages which are patent, it is a good rule; but where damages
are afterwards developed, it is not a rule to be commended. It is
a rule which sometimes produces a harsh result, and if it were now
for the first time put forward, I could not assent to its being
pushed to the length to which it has sometimes been carried; in
fact it is never wanted except when injury, undeveloped at the
time of action brought, is afterwards developed. However, the
maxim exists, and it must receive a proper application. But, in
order to apply it, we must often suppose -what is not the case. It is
to be assumed that the subsequent damage was in the contemplation
of the person injured. The question, however, remains whether
the cause of action is the same. In this case the injury was occasioned by the negligent driving of the defendant's servant.

Sup-

pose that by the negligent driving of the defendant's servant the
van had run against the plaintiff's cab, and had injured him
without doing any damage to the cab, an action would have lain,
and any apparent bodily injury which the plaintiff might have
sustained would be a cause of action. Suppose that the defendant's
,servant, by his negligent driving, had damaged the plaintiff's cab
without injuring him personally ; under circumstances of that kind
the cause of action would be a damage to the plaintiff's property.
The -owner of property has a right to have it kept free from damage. The plaintiff has brought the present action on the ground
-that he has been injured in his person. He has the right to be
unmolested in all his bodily powers. The collision with the
defendant's .van did not give rise to only one cause of action :
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the plaintiff sustained bodily injuries, he was injured in a distinct
right, and he became entitled to sue for a cause of action distinct
from the cause of action in respect of the damage to his goods;
therefore the plaintiff is at liberty to maintain the present action.
Different tests have been applied for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the judgment recovered in one action is a bar to a subsequent action. I do not decide this case on the ground of any test
which may be considered applicable to it; but I may mention one
of them; it is whether the same sort of evidence would prove the
plaintiff's case in the two actions. Apply that test. to the present
case. In the action brought in the county court, in order to support the plaintiff's case, it would be necessary to give evidence of
the damage done to the plaintiff's vehicle. In the present action
it would be necessary to give evidence of the bodily injury occasioned to the plaintiff, and of the sufferings which he has undergone, and for this purpose to call medical witnesses. This one test
shows that the causes of action as to the damage done to the
plaintiff's cab, and as to the injury occasioned to the plaintiff's
person, are distinct. Therefore we are not now called upon to apply
a legal maxim, the application of which ought not to be stretched.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of 3501. awarded by the
jury. Two actions may be brought in respect of the same facts,
where those facts give rise to two distinct causes of action.
BowEN, L. J.-The plaintiff in this case has recovered a verdict and 3501. damages for personal injuries sustained by him
through the negligence of the defendant's servant in driving a van,
which had come into collision with the plaintiff's cab, thrown the
plaintiff from his box, and seriously injured him in his legs. Previously to bringing the action the plaintiff had sued the defendant
in the county court for damages done to his cab in the collision, and
the particulars delivered under his plaint had been confined to the
damages which the cab had sustained. The defendant in the county
court action paid 41. 3s. into court together with 6s. costs, upon which
the plaintiff had discontinued the county court plaint. The present
action was now brought in the High Court for personal injuries, of
the importance and extent of which the plaintiff alleged that he had
been ignorant at the time of the county court proceedings. On a motion for a new trial the court below have entered a judgment for the
defendant on the ground that the recovery of damages in respect of
the cab in the county court is a bar to any further action for injury
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to the plaintiff's person. The rule of the ancient common law is
that where one is barred in any action, real or personal, by judgment, demurrer, confession or verdict, he is barred as to that or the
like action, of the like nature, for the same thing forever. "It has
been well said," says Lord COKE in a note to Ferrer's Case, 6 Coke
9 a., "interest reipublic.T ut sit finis litium, otherwise," says Lord
COKE, "a' great oppression might be done under color and pretence
of law :" see, also, Sparry's Case, 5 Coke 61 a; Higgens's Case, 6
Id. 45 a; Year Book 12 Edward IV., p. 10 13,. Accordingly in
HUudson v. Lee, 4 Coke 43 a, it was held to be a good plea in bar to
an appeal of mayhem, that the appellant had recovered damages in
an action for trespass brought for the same assault, battery, and
wounding. So in Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, it was decided
to be an answer to an action for seducing a man's servant from his
service, that penalties had previously been recovered by the master
in satisfaction of the injury done him. So too in Phillips v. Berryman, 3 Doug. 287, a recovery in replevin was held to be good bar
to an action on the statute of Marlbridge for an excessive distress, on
the ground that the plaintiff had already had his remedy, and that
a recovery in one personal action is a bar to all other personal
actions on the same subject. The principle is frequently stated in
the form of another legal proverb, Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem
causa. It is a well settled rule of law, that damages resulting from
one and the same cause of action, must be assessed and recovered
once for all. The difficulty in each instance arises upon the application of this rule, how far is the cause which is being litigated afresh
the same cause in substance with that which has been the subject of
the previous suit. "The principal consideration," says DEGREY, C.
J., in Hitchen v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 827, is whether it be precisely
the same cause of action in both, appearing by proper averments in
a plea, or by proper facts stated in a special verdict, or a special
case." "And one great criterion," he adds, "of this identity is
that the same evidence will maintain both actions." See per Lord
ELDON, in Martin v. Kennedy, 2 B. & P. 71. "The question,"
says GRosig, J., in Sedden v. Tvtop, 6 T. R. 607, "is not whether
the sum demanded might have been, recovered in the former action,
the only inquiry is whether the same cause of action has been
litigated and considered in the former action."
Accordingly,
"though a declaration contain counts under which the plaintiff's
whole claim might have been recovered, yet if no attempt was made
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to give evidence upon some of the claims, they might be recovered
in another action :" Thorpe v. Cooper, 5 Bing. 129. It is evident
therefore that the application of the rule depends, not upon any
technical consideration of the identity of forms of action, but upon
matter of substance.
I have now to consider the application of the above doctrine to
the case of the present action; and the question to be decided is
whether the damage done by the negligent driving of the defendant's servant to the plaintiff's cab is in substance the same cause
of action as the damage caused by such negligence to the plaintiffs
person. Nobody can doubt that if the plaintiff had recovered any
damages for injuries to his person, he could not have maintained a
further action for fresh bodily injuries caused by the same act of
negligence, merely because they had been discovered or developed
subsequently. See Fetter v. Beal, 1 Ld. Raym. 339. "The
jury," says the court in that case, "have in the former action
considered the nature of the wound and given damages for all the
damage that it had done to the plaintiff." This authority, however, leaves still open the point I now have to determine, whether
the cause of the action arising from damage to the plaintiff's cab
is in substance identical with that which accrues in consequence of
the damage caused to his person. In order clearly to elucidate this
question, let me assume, for the sake of argument, that the damage
had been caused by some act of the defendant himself, and not
merely an act of his servant. According to the old distinctions of
forms of actions which still have a historical value as throwing light
upon the principles and definitions of the common law, the form of
action upon such an hypothesis would have been trespass to the
person for the personal injury; trespass to goods for the damage
to the vehicle. Injury would have been done to the plaintiff in
respect of two absolute and independent rights, the distinction
between which is inveterate both in the English and Roman law.
Every one in this country has an absolute right to security for his
person. Everybody has further an absolute right to have his enjoyment of his goods and chattels unmeddled with by others. In
the hypothetical case I am assuming both these rights would have
been injured, and though the two injuries might have been combined in one suit, could it have been said that the subject-matter
of each grievance was the same ? Applying the test of identity
furnished by DE GREY, 0. J., in Hitchen v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl.
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827, the first matter that is obvious is that the same evidence
would not have supported an action for trespass to the person and
an action for the trespass to the goods. In the one case the identity of the man injured and the character of his injuries would be
in issue, and justifications might conceivably be pleaded as to the
assault, which would have nothing to do with the damage done
to the goods and chattels. In the other case the plaintiff's title to
the goods might have been in issue in addition to the question
of the damage done to them. Different provisions of the Statute
of Limitations might possibly have applied in each case. And
finally, the damage in one case might have been directly due to
the wrongful act complained of; in the other case it might not.
There is no authority, so far as I know, in the books, for the proposition that a recovery in an action for a trespass to the person
would be a bar to the maintenance of an action for a trespass to
goods, committed at the same time. In the present instance, as
the defendant himself was not driving, but his servant, trespass
would not have lain under the old law, and the plaintiff's remedy would have been in an action on the case for negligence, based
on the negligent management by the servant of his master's horses,
a negligence for which, in the eye of the law, the master or employer
is responsible. Now, what is the gist of such an action on the case
for negligence? If the whole of the plaintiff's case were to be
stated and the entire story told, it seems to me that it would have
comprised two separate or distinct grievances, narrated, it is true,
in one statement or case. Actions for the negligent management
of any animal, or any personal or movable chattel, such as a ship
or machine, or instrument, all are based upon the same principle,
viz., that a person, who, contrary to his duty, conducts himself
negligently in the management of that which contains in itself an
element of danger to others, is liable for all injury caused by his
want of care or skill. Such an action is based upon the union of
the negligence and the injuries caused thereby, which, in such
an instance, will, as a rule, involve, and have been accompanied
by specific damage. Without reverting to the Roman law, or
discussing the refinements of scholastic jurisprudence and the
various uses that have been made, either by judges or juridical
writers, of the terms "injuria" and "damnm," it is sufficient to
say that the gist of an action for negligence seems to me to be the
harm to person or property negligently perpetrated. In a certain
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class of cases the mere violation of a legal right imports a damage.
"Actual perceptible damage," says PARKE,B., in Embrey v. Owen,
6 Ex. 353, at 368, "is not indispensable as the foundation of an
action ; it is sufficient to show the violation of a right, in which
case the law will presume damage." But this principle is not, as
a rule, applicable to actions for negligence which are not brought
to establish a bare right, but to recover compensation for substantial
injury. "Generally speaking," says LITTLEDALE, J., in Williams
v. .ilorland, 2 B. & 0. 916, "there must be temporal loss or damage accruing from the wrongful act of another, in order to entitle
a party to maintain an action on the case." See Fay v. Prentice,
1 0. B. 835, per MAULE, J.
This leads me to consider whether, in the case of an accident
caused by negligent driving, in which both the goods and the person
of the plaintiff are injured, there is one cause of action only, or
two causes of action which are severable and distinct. This is a
very difficult question to answer, and I feel great doubt and hesitation in differing from the judgment of the court below and from
the great authority of the present chief justice of England. According to the popular use of language, the defendant's servant has
done one act and one only, the driving of the one vehicle negligently against the other. But the rule of law, which 1 am discussing, is not framed with reference to some popular expressions of
the sort, but for the sake of preventing an abuse of substantial
justice. Two separate kinds of injury were in fact inflicted, and
two wrongs done. The mere negligent driving in itself, if accompanied by no injury to the plaintiff, was not actionable at all, forit
was not a wrongful act at all till a wrong arose out of the damage
which it caused. One wrong was done as soon as the plaintiff's enjoyment of his property was substantially interfered with. A further wrong arose as soon as the driving also caused injury to the
plaintiff's person. Both causes of action, in one sense, may be said
to be founded upon one act of the defendant's servant, but they are
not on that account identical causes of action. The wrong consists in the damage done without lawful excuse, not the act of
driving, which if no damage had ensued would have been legally
unimportant. It certainly would appear unsatisfactory to hold that the
damage done in a carriage accident to a man's portmanteauwas the
same injury as the damage done to his spine, or that an action under
Lord CAMPBELL'S Act by the widow and children of a person who
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has been killed in a railway collision, is barred by proof that the
deceased recovered in his lifetime for the damage done to his luggage. It may be said that it would be convenient to force persons
to sue for all their grievances at once, and not to split their demands;
but there is no positive law (except so far as the county court acts
have from a very early date dealt with the matter) against splitting
demands which are essentially separable (see Seddon v. Tutop, 6
T. R. 607), although the High Court has inherent power to prevent vexation or oppression, and by staying proceedings or by apportioning the costs, would have always ample means of preventing
any injustice arising out of the reckless use of legal procedure. Ih
the present case the plaintiff's particulars in the county court were
confined to the damage done to his cab ; the injury to his person,
therefore, was neither litigated nor considered in the county court.
The real test is not, I think, whether the plaintiff had the opportqnity of recovering in the first action what he claims to recover in
the second: see Seddon v. Tutop, 6 T. R. 607. With all respect,
I do not see how it can be said that Nelson v. Couch, 15 C. B. N.
S. 99, so decides. That case established only the converse rule,
viz., that the maxim, "nemo debet bis vexari," cannot apply where
in the first action the plaintiff bad no such opportunity of satisfying his claim. The language of COLERIDGE, J., and the other members
of the court, Hodsoll v. Sallebrass, 11 A. & E. 305, must, I think,
be read by the light of the special circumstances of that case; and
so read, is not inconsistent with the view at which I have here
arrived. I am in no way departing from the language of this
authority, in holding, as I do in the present instance, that the damage, for which the plaintiff is now suing, accrues from a different
injury, and, therefore, a different wrong from that for which he
recovered damages in the county court. The view at which I have
arrived, is in conformity with the reasoning of the judgment recently
pronounced by this court in the case of Mitchell v. Darley Main Coltiery Co., L. R., 14 Q. B. Div. 125, where itwas held, reversing Lamb
v. Walker, 3 Q. B. D. 889, that each fresh subsidence of soil in the
case of witharawal of support gave rise to a fresh cause of action.
Nor do I feel called upon to extend the application of the sound and
valuable principle of law, that none shall be vexed twice for the
same cause of action, to a case to which it has never yet been
applied, and to which it can only be applied by pursuing analogy to
lengths, which would involve practical injustice. The present case
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is one in which I am conscious that lawyers of great authority do
differ, and will differ. But on the whole, in my opinion, the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division ought to be reversed, and the
judgment entered at the trial for the plaintiff be restored with costs
to the plaintiff, including the costs below and of this appeal.
LORD COLERIDGE. 0. J.-In
this case, I am, with much regret,
unable to concur in the judgment of my Brother BowEN, to which
I understand the Master of the Rolls to assent. I should have
been glad in the face of this difference of opinion to have given reasons at length for my inability to agree in the judgment. But the
plaintiff very naturally presses for judgment, and I am unable to
do more than shortly to express my dissent. It appears to me that
whether the negligence of the servant, or the impact of the vehicle
which the servant drove, be the technical cause of action, equally
the cause is one and the same: that the injury done to the plaintiff
is injury done to him at one and the same moment, by one and the
same act in respect of different rights, i. e. his person and his goods,
I do not in the least deny; but it seems to me a subtlety not warranted by law to hold that a man cannot bring two actions, if he is
injured in his arm and in his leg, but can bring two, if besides his
arm and leg being injured, his trousers which contain his leg, and his
coat-sleeve, which contain his arm, have been torn. The consequences
of holding this are so serious, and may be very probably so oppressive, that I at least must respectfully dissent from a judgment which
establishes it. I think that the court below was right, and that this
appeal should be dismissed.
That the same act-the same tortmay cause two injuries, and subject the
party to two different suits, is, of course,
legally possible. The most obvious instance is where two different persons
are injured in their person or individual
property by one and the same act of the
defendant. There, clearly enough, the
wrongdoer is liable to a suit by each;
and if one steals the property of A., and
other property of B. at the same time,
he is liable to two indictments and two
punishments; for really it is two larcenies, although only one act of taking :
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 104 Mass.
552; Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Id.
409 ; State v. Thurston, 2 McMullan
VOL. XJXIII.-48

382 ; United States v. .eerman,
5
Crunch 0. C. 412, a valuable case on
the point.
But where only one person is injured
by one isolated and single act, not continued or repeated, whether that injury
be to two portions of his person, as his
leg and his arm, or to his person and
also to his property, or only to two different articles of his personal property,
it is not easy to see, upon the wellestablished principles, how there are
two causes of action, or why there
should be, or need be, two different
suits to recover the whole amount of
damage sustained.
That in the last instance given above,

